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Abstract 
This study is devoted to pursuing a principled 
organization of the lexicon. It aims at ex-
plaining one aspect of causative predicates 
from semantic perspective. It has been noticed 
that some of the causative predicates have a 
modal component, making the caused eventu-
ality “prospective” - whether or not the caused 
event/state holds in the actual world is unde-
termined. However, exactly which predicate 
contains modality and which does not has been 
a mystery, and even has not been discussed as 
far as I know. I will describe how the prospec-
tivity is determined and argue that no idiosyn-
crasy is involved here. 
1 Introduction 
One remarkable fact about human language is that it 
takes only two or three years for children to acquire 
the basics of the grammar and vocabulary of their 
native language. That is, language learning requires 
only a small number of experiences. The smallness 
of experiences children need has inspired the work 
on the theory of Generative Grammar. It argues that 
human beings are born with Universal Grammar, 
the set of knowledge shared by every human lan-
guage. Once UG is properly defined, it should pre-
dict a considerable number of the grammatical 
properties of human language. Linguists in the 
generative enterprise have struggled to determine 
exactly what constitutes UG. They pursue a theory 
with maximum explanatory power with minimum 
necessity of experiences. 
 However, there is an area in which neces-
sity of experiences is irrefutable: The lexicon. As a 
mental dictionary, the lexicon consists of the words 
and morphemes of a language and their syntactic, 
phonetic, morphologic, and other idiosyncratic in-
formation. Since it would not make any sense to 
assume that, for example, an English word dog is a 
universal word to refer the certain animal, acquiring 
the lexicon definitely calls for experiences. In fact, 
since the starting point of the generative enterprise, 
the linguists has tended to regard the lexicon as a list 
of idiosyncrasies: A list of unpredictable facts 
which children must learn and memorize through 
experiences, for which no theory or even generali-
zation is possible. 
 The above tendency is not totally unrea-
sonable. Since the lexicon is finite, memorizing all 
the list is not logically impossible. Nevertheless, 
more recent study emphasizes that work on the 
lexicon should be “guided by the perception that 
there are generalizations relating apparently distinct 
items, which could not be simply accidental,” 
(Reinhart, 2000) and we should “proceed from the 
null hypothesis that nothing is acquired through 
experience” (Pesetsky, 1995). They show that 
seemingly random morphological or theta-theoretic 
alternations are indeed predictable by their syntactic 
properties (Pesetsky) or a general theory of theta 
system (Reinhart). 
 Following their intuition, this study is de-
voted to pursuing a more principled organization of 
the lexicon. It aims at explaining one aspect of 
causative predicates from semantic perspective. It 
has been noticed that some of the causative predi-
cates have a modal component, making the caused 
eventuality “prospective” - whether or not the 
caused event/state holds in the actual world is un-
determined. (Koenig and Davis, 2001; Beavers, 
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2011; Martin, 2015; Martin and Schäfer, 2017; 
Harley and Jung, 2015, among others). However, 
exactly which predicate contains modality has been 
a mystery, and even has not been discussed as far as 
I know. I will describe how the prospectivity is 
determined and argue that no idiosyncrasy is in-
volved here. 
1.1 Theoretical Background 
There are two major assumptions underlying this 
study. Firstly, I assume that verbs are represented 
with a Lexical Conceptual Structure, or LCS (Levin 
and Rappaport Hovav, 2011; Rappaport Hovav and 
Levin 2010), and this structure is formally analyzed 
by Neo-Davidsonian event semantics (Parsons, 
1990). 
 An LCS is a decomposed structure of verbs. 
It is composed of a limited set of primitive predi-
cates, like act, become, have, and cause. The idi-
osyncratic component of a verb, called a verbal root, 
may be associated with LCS in two ways, either it 
modifies a primitive predicate, or it becomes an 
argument of a primitive predicate. Typically, the 
former case is for an action verb like run repre-
sented as (1a), whereas the latter case is for a 
change of state verb like a transitive use of break, 
represented in (1b). (The variables x and y represent 
participants of the event.) Combined with the event 
semantics, the verbs in (1) have the denotations (2). 
 
(1) a. run = [x act<run>] 
b. break = [x act] cause [y become <break>] 
 
(2) a. [[run]] = λx.λe. act(e) & run(e) & subject(e,  
x) 
b. [[break]] = λy.λx.λe. act(e) & subject(e, x) 
& ∃e’[cause(e, e’) & break(e’) 
&  theme(e’, y)]1 
 
 The denotation (2b) is closely related with 
my second assumption. I define a causative predi-
cate to be a semantically complex predicate which 
contains two eventualities: causing and caused 
1 There are lot of ways to represent a change of state verb. Since 
the present proposal does not hinge on any specific represen-
tation, I do not commit which of them is licit.  
eventualities. In short, a causative predicate is 
bi-eventive. 
 The bieventivity is tested with an adverb 
again (Dowty, 1979). If a verb has a bieventieve 
structure, it induces a scopal ambiguity in the in-
terpretation. To see this, consider the following 
sentence. 
 
(3) a. John opened the door again. 
b. ∃e[act(e) & subject(e, J) & ∃e’[cause(e, e’) 
& open(e’) & theme(e’, the-door)]] 
c. again(∃e[act(e) & subject(e, J) & 
∃e’[cause(e, e’) & open(e’) & theme(e’, 
the-door)]]) 
d. ∃e[act(e) & subject(e, J) & 
again(∃e’[cause(e, e’) & open(e’) & 
theme(e’, the-door)])] 
 
 The transitive use of open is a typical in-
stance of causative predicates. The sentence (3), 
ignoring again, has the denotation (3b). Notice that 
(3a) has two interpretations. It means either John 
caused the door open and he had opened it before, 
or John caused the door open and it had been open 
before (not necessary opened by John). Again 
modifies the whole sentence in the former inter-
pretation, while in the latter case it modifies only 
the resultant state. Each interpretation has the de-
notation (3c) and (3d), respectively. This ambiguity 
is absent in a mono-eventive construction such as 
John hit Mary again. Hence, hit is not a causative 
predicate.  
 With the above assumptions in mind, I will 
pursue the theory of causative predicates which 
requires the minimal amount of experiences. The 
rest of this study is organized as follows. In the 
section 2 I will lay out the relevant data and detect a 
generalization. I will formalize it in section 3. An 
important implication for Manner/Result Comple-
mentarity will also be discussed there. The section 4 
deals with the data which apparently poses a prob-
lem to the proposal. In section 5, I will extend the 
analysis to a peculiar class of verbs, namely the 
defeasible causative verbs. The section 6 concludes 
this paper.  
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2 Prospectivity 
2.1 The Data 
For some of the causative verbs, the resultant 
eventuality is only prospective: Whether it happens 
in the actual world or not is undetermined. Take 
ditransitive predicates, for example. Many authors 
have proposed that ditransitive predicates have an 
underlying causal relation, with a resultant state “a 
recipient has a theme” (Pesetsky, 1995; Harley, 
2002; Harley and Jung, 2015; Beavers, 2011). As 
Pylkkänen (2008) and Beavers (2011) observe, 
whether the resultant state is entailed or not depends 
on the verb. Consider the following sentences and 
their LCS. 
 
(4) a. John gave Mary a ball, #but she never  
received/got it. 
b. [[John act] cause [Mary have a ball]] 
 
(5) a. John threw Mary a ball, but she never  
received/got it. 
b. [[John act<throw>] cause [Mary have a ball]] 
 
Though give and throw have the same LCS except 
for contribution of the verbal root, they show an 
interesting difference in an entailment pattern. Give 
entails the resultant state [Mary have a ball] and 
negating that state (but...) leads to contradiction. On 
the other hand, for throw the resultant state is only 
prospective and negating it raises no contradiction. 
The result of throw may or may not happen in the 
actual world. 
 Since Koenig and Davis (2001), it is 
common to assume that verbs with a prospective 
result have a sublexical modal component. Ac-
cording to this analysis, the LCS of throw is repre-
sented as (6), with the resultant state being under the 
scope of a modal operator ♢ (Beavers, 2011). 
 
(6) [[John act<throw>] ♢cause [Mary have a ball]] 
 
 Although this resolution is widespread and 
assumed by many authors (Beavers, 2011; Martin, 
2015; Martin and Schäfer, 2017; Harley and Jung, 
2015), a question much less frequently addressed is 
which verb has a modal component. Since the lex-
icon is finite, it may not be totally unreasonable to 
conclude that the presence or absence of modality is 
idiosyncratically determined and we have to mem-
orize this. However, as pointed out in the previous 
section, we should start a linguistic enterprise with 
the null hypothesis that nothing requires experi-
ences. Below, I will argue that the prospectivity of 
causative verbs is actually predictable. In the rest of 
this section I will lay out the relevant data from 
various kinds of causative predicates. 
2.1.1. Lexical Causative Verbs 
Pylkkänen (2008) observes that lexical causative 
verbs in English always entail a resultant state. 
 
(7) a. #I flew the kite over the field but it didn’t  
fly. 
b. #I broke the vase but it didn’t break. 
c. #I cooked the meat but it didn’t cook. 
(Pylkkänen, 2008: 15) 
2.1.2. Periphrastic causative verbs 
Kartunnen (1971) claims that make entails the re-
sultant event. On the other hand, Jackendoff (1990) 
observes verbs like urge, goad, pressure do not 
carry the entailment. These verbs can be used with 
unsuccessfully, and negating their resultant event 
does not lead to contradiction.2 
 
(8) a. John made Mary leave, #but Mary didn’t  
leave. 
b. Harry pressured/urged/goaded Sam to go  
away, but he didn’t go away. 
c. Harry unsuccessfully urged/pressured/goad  
Sam to leave. 
2.1.3. Ditransitive Verbs 
As observed above, give entails the resultant state 
(possession) while throw does not. Pylkkänen 
2 One may think that a non-manner counterpart of 
urge/goad/pressure is force. Indeed, Jackendoff and Kartunnen 
claim that force have the result entailment. However, literature 
has reported contradictory judgements on this. Koenig and 
Davis (2001) and Martin (2018) claim that the result of force 
can be negated (at least certain circumstances). In order to 
avoid complexity, I leave the analysis of force for another 
occasion.   
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(2008) further observes that write and send do not 
entail the resultant state. 
 
(9) a. I sent Bill the letter but he never got it. 
b. I wrote Sue a letter but she never got it. 
(Pylkkänen, 2008: 15) 
2.2 Generalization 
With the set of data above, we can now detect a 
generalization about presence/absence of the result 
entailment, namely (10). 
 
(10) If a manner of the causing event is specified in 
the lexicon, then the resultant event/state be-
comes prospective. If not, the resultant 
event/state is obtained in the actual world. 
 
 In order to see what (10) is supposed to 
mean, consider again the ditransitive verbs. Give, a 
verb with the result entailment, does not specify any 
manner on its causing event. Any event that causes 
the recipient to have the theme can be a causing 
event of this verb. On the other hand, throw, send, 
and write require a certain manner. In a sentence I 
threw Mary a ball (and she got it), the causing event 
must be implemented in throwing manner. The 
same requirement exists in send and write. 
 The generalization (10) can be extended to 
the other group of verbs. The lexical causative verbs, 
which always entail their resultant state, have no 
specification on a manner of the causing event. 
Make does not require any manner on the causing 
event, while urge, goad, and pressure do. For ex-
ample, urge requires its causing event to be im-
plemented by verbal recommendation or persuasion. 
As predicted, among these verbs only make carries 
the result entailment. 
3 Proposal 
In this section I will formalize the generalization 
(10) with the proposal summarized in (11). 
 
(11) a. All causative predicates have a modal  
component. 
b. The generalization (10) follows from the 
characterization of a modal base and an or-
dering source of causative predicates. 
(11a) states that a modal component is a universal 
property of causative predicates. Thus, there is no 
such variation that some verbs introduce modality 
while others do not. I state a general definition of 
causative predicates as in (12)3. 
 
(12) Let φ be a causative predicate with a resultant 
event (or state) ψ. Then, 
[[φ]] = λx.λy.λe.λw. act(e, y, w) & 
∀w’∈maxg(e)(∩f(e)) [∃e’cause(e, e’, 
w’) & ψ(e’, x, w’) ], where 
a. f(e) is a circumstantial modal base: 
 f(e) = {p | p is a proposition denoting the 
laws of nature and other relevant facts of the 
world where e happens} 
b. g(e) is an ordering source: g(e) = {q| q is a 
proposition denoting the norms inherently 
associated with e} 
c. maxg(e) selects the most ideal world(s) from 
∩f(e), given the ordering source g(e). 
 
The types of the modal base and the ordering source 
are lexically specified, not provided from a context. 
I will argue that when no norms are inherently as-
sociated with e, the effect of the ordering source and 
maxg(e) becomes vacuous. Below, I describe how 
(12) works and how it derives the generalization 
(10). 
 Consider first a construction with throw, a 
ditransitive verb with a manner specification on the 
causing event. 
 
(13) a. John threw Mary a ball (but she never got  
it). 
b. ∃e act(e, John, w0) & throwing(e) & 
∀w’∈maxg(e)( ∩f (e)) [∃e’ cause(e, e’, w’) & 
have(e’, Mary, a ball, w’) ] 
 
Throw does not entail the resultant possession. This 
is due to the effect of the ordering source. Since the 
verb has a manner specification, g(e) contains 
propositions denoting the norms associated with the 
manner, e.g. [[the agent throws with a proper 
form]], [[the agent put enough amount of energy]], 
3 The definitions of f(e) and g(e) are based on Kratzer (2013). 
The definition of max operator is based on Hacquard (2011). 
Following Hacquard (2006, 2010), I assume that a modal base 
and an ordering source take an event argument. 
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etc. Given g(e), the resultant state e’ happens in all 
of the ideal worlds. Since the actual world may not 
be such an ideal world (i.e. w0 may not be contained 
in maxg(e)(∩f (e)), the resultant state is not entailed 
in the actual world. The same reasoning applies to 
send, write, urge, goad, and pressure. 
Turning to cases where the resultant state is 
obtained, consider a sentence with a lexical causa-
tive verb break. 
 
(14) a. John broke the window. 
b. ∃e act(e, John, w0) & ∀w’∈maxg(e)(∩f(e))  
[∃e’ cause(e, e’, w’) & break(e’, the win-
dow, w’) ] 
 
Recall that lexical causative verbs always entail 
their resultant state. Thus, in (14b), the broken state 
of the window must be obtained in the actual world 
(w0). Actually, this is exactly what (12) predicts. 
Notice that ∩f(e) always contains the actual world: 
Since f(e) is a circumstantial, realistic modal base, 
for all the propositions p in f(e), w0∈[[p]]. Moreover, 
lexical causative verbs do not have any specifica-
tion on a manner of the causing event (e), so in 
(14b) the effect of maxg(e) is vacuous. Thus, (14b) 
just requires that the resultant state e’ is caused by e 
in all the worlds contained in ∩f(e). Since ∩f(e) 
contains the actual world, the resultant state is cor-
rectly entailed. Give and make entail the resultant 
state/event by the same reasoning. 
 Summarizing the proposal, the definition 
(12) derives the property of causative predicates 
discussed in this study. My proposal has at least two 
advantages. First, we can treat causative predicates 
uniformly by stating that they all introduce a modal 
component. Second, presence/absence of the result 
entailment is predictable from the property of the 
causing event. In the next subsection I will argue 
that as a consequence of the proposal we can derive 
Manner/Result Complementarity. 
3.1 Manner/Result Complementarity 
One of the most influential and widely shared con-
straints in lexical semantics is Manner/Result 
Complementarity (Rappaport Hovav and Levin, 
1998, 2010). This constraint banns a verbal root to 
specify both manner and result. Although I believe 
this constraint is real and on the right track, why 
there is such a constraint is not frequently dis-
cussed: It is just a stipulated statement. 
 The present proposal offers an answer to the 
question. Imagine that there is a verb which speci-
fies both manner and result. Since that verb neces-
sarily has a causative component (“result” cannot 
be defined without it), the verb has the modal base 
and the ordering source proposed here. The manner 
specification makes the result prospective by the 
same reasoning described above, so no specific 
result is entailed. Thus, even if the verb specifies a 
result as well as a manner, that cannot be observed 
in the entailment pattern and the verb seems to 
specify only a manner. In short, Manner/Result 
Complementarity is an illusion caused by the modal 
component. 
4 Discussion 
In this section I will discuss two sets of data. One is 
about verbs hand and pass, which at first sight 
seems to be a counterexample of the present analy-
sis. The other one is about a verb force, for which 
literature have reported contradictory judgements. 
4.1 hand, pass (the salt) 
Beavers (2011) points out that the resultant posses-
sion is entailed with hand and pass (the salt) [but 
not pass (the ball). See below.] 
 
(15) #John handed Mary the salt, but he dropped it 
before she got it. 
 
Since hand and pass (the salt) clearly encode a 
manner of the causing event, this data seems to pose 
a problem to my proposal. 
 However, the judgement is not that 
clear-cut. Christopher Tancredi (p.c.) notes that a 
sentence like John handed Mary a book, but she 
refused to take it is acceptable. Thus, I argue here 
that hand and pass (the salt) basically get the same 
analysis as the one given to throw: their resultant 
state is prospective. The strong result implicature 
comes from the nature of their manner. As Beavers 
himself points out, these predicates “necessarily 
involve two people in close proximity […] in such 
events it is unlikely there would be a failure of 
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transfer.” (p. 30) Thus, the successful possession in 
(15) comes not from logical entailment, but from 
pragmatic inference generated due to the nature of 
the manner of hand. 
 This argument is supported by the fact I 
briefly mentioned above: Although pass (the salt) 
seems to imply the resultant state, pass (the ball) 
does not. This is because, I argue, one is more likely 
to stand in close proximity to the recipient when 
s/he passes the salt than when s/he passes the ball. 
Again, the resultant sate of pass is prospective as 
my proposal predicts, but the result is strongly in-
ferred by the nature of the manner.4 
4.2 Speaker Variation 
As noted in the footnote 2, Jackendoff (1990) ob-
serves that force carries the result entailment. The 
same observation is made in Kartunnen (1971). 
However, Koenig and Davis (2001) and Martin 
(2018) note that force does not entail any resultant 
state, which apparently pose a problem to my pro-
posal. Why do the judgements differ like this? 
 Note here that in principle lexical infor-
mation can vary from speaker to speaker. More 
specifically, some may have a different definition of 
force than other people. Of course, it is not desirable 
to assume lexical meaning can differ drastically – if 
force had a meaning assumed in the previous sec-
tion to some speakers while to others it has a 
meaning of prevent, then the communication would 
be entirely impossible. However, assuming minor 
variation among speakers is not implausible. Thus, 
in order to account for the contradictory observation 
mentioned above, I argue that force specifies a 
manner of the causing event in some speakers’ mind, 
but not in others’. For instance, one may believe 
that force must involve a direct verbal order in the 
causing event. This is just a minor change, but it is 
enough to activate the ordering source and to make 
the resultant state prospective. 
4 Another possible explanation is that hand specifies an in-
strument, not a manner (Akira Watanabe, p.c.). As for pass the 
salt, Ayaka Sugawara (p.c.) points out that the construction is 
so idiomatic that it loses the prospectivity. I leave for future 
research an investigation on whether these proposals are valid. 
5 Extension: Defeasible Causative Verbs 
5.1 General Account 
In this section I will extend the present proposal to a 
rather peculiar group of causative predicates, called 
defeasible causative verbs (Martin, 2015; Martin 
and Schäfer 2017). The peculiarity of these verbs 
can be seen in the contrast observed in the following 
sentences. 
 
(16) a. Hans schmeichelte Maria, aber sie fühlte 
Hans flattered     Marie,  but  she    felt 
sich überhaupt nicht geschmeichelt. 
REFL absolutely NEG flattered. 
‘John flattered Mary, but she felt absolutely 
not flattered.’ 
b. #Dieses Detail schmeichelte Maria, 
This     detail flattered         Marie, 
aber sie fühlte sich überhaupt nicht 
but   she felt     REFL absolutely NEG 
geschmeichelt. 
flattered. 
‘This detail flattered Mary, but she felt 
absolutely not flattered.’ 
(German, Martin and Schäfer, 2017: 88) 
 
Notice that(16a) and (16b) differ in agentivity of the 
subjects. When the verb schmeicheln ‘flatter’ takes 
a non-agentive subject as in (16b), the sentence 
entails Mary got flattered. Negating this entailment 
leads to contradiction. On the other hand, when the 
verb takes an agentive subject, no entailment exists 
so the whole sentence (16a) is felicitous. This 
property is cross-linguistically observed in verbs 
like teach, offer, and discourage, among many 
others (see Martin and Schäfer, 2017; Kratzer, 
2013). 
 How does the proposal so far account for 
this contrast? Recall that in my analysis the result-
ant event/state is entailed when the effect of the 
ordering source g(e) is vacuous. Then, we have to 
assume that defeasible causative verbs deactivate 
the ordering source when they take a non-agentive 
subject. How can we formalize this? 
 Martin (2015) points out that we cannot talk 
about a manner of a non-agentive, inanimate subject. 
She notes “we do not differentiate the wind that 
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may blow out a fire from the wind that may close a 
door through distinctive features: All these winds 
are undifferentiated for us.” (p. 257)5 I argue with 
her that an inanimate subject cannot manifest a 
manner of action. I further argue that the defeasible 
causative verbs are special in that they have two 
possible LCS representations, one with a manner 
specification and the other without it. Then, we can 
predict that a non-agentive subject will nullify the 
effect of an ordering source. In order to see this, 
consider the following contrast and the LCSs. 
Again, ♢ represents the modal component with the 
modal base and the ordering source characterized 
above. 
 
(17) a. Ivan taught me Russian, but I did not learn  
anything. 
b. Lipson’s textbook taught me Russian, #but I 
did not learn anything. 
(Martin and Schäfer, 2017: 87) 
 
(18) a. [x act<teach>] ♢cause [y <learn> z] 
b. [x act] ♢cause [y <learn> z] 
 
 (17a) does not tell us anything new. The 
ordering source g(e) contains, among others, prop-
ositions like [[a teacher acts on students effective-
ly]], [[a teacher’s knowledge on the subject is 
enough]], etc., the norms associated with the man-
ner of teaching. Since the actual world may not be 
an ideal world, the sentence does not carry the en-
tailment. 
 The argument that an inanimate subject 
cannot manifest a manner of action is crucial when 
we analyze (17b). Since Lipson’s textbook cannot 
manifest a manner of <teach>, it is incompatible 
with the LCS (18a). Thus, it obligatorily enters the 
alternative LCS (18b). Since this entry does not 
have a manner specification, it correctly entails the 
resultant learning event. 6  The reasoning for the 
defeasible causative verbs is summarized in (19). 
5 In spite of the shared intuition, Martin takes a different path to 
account for the behavior of defeasible causative verbs. Com-
parison of the two accounts are beyond the scope of this study. 
6 In fact, verbs like throw and goad constantly resist an inani-
mate subject (*The heavy wind throw him a towel. / *The situ-
ation goaded him to leave.) Why, then, is that teach has an 
alternative manner-less LCS while throw does not? As Martin 
(2019) and Demirdache and Martin (2015) observe, there is a 
 
(19) a. Defeasible causative verbs are special in  
that they are associated with two possible 
LCSs. One specifies a manner of the causing 
event the other does not. 
b. Since inanimate subjects are generally in-
compatible with a manner-specified LCS, 
they have no choice but to enter the man-
ner-less version of LCS. As a result, the 
predicate entails the resultant eventuality. 
 
 In this section I showed that the peculiar 
behavior of the defeasible causative verbs is pre-
dicted correctly by the present proposal. The pres-
ence of the result entailment with a non-agentive 
subject naturally follows from the interaction be-
tween the property of the subject and manner spec-
ification. 
6 Conclusion 
In this study, I argued that all causative predicates 
introduce a modal component. This analysis enables 
us to treat all causative predicates uniformly and to 
predict which verb has the prospectivity. I also 
showed that the present analysis can be extended to 
the defeasible causative verbs. Overall, the proposal 
demonstrates that the prospectivety and the defea-
sibility is not an idiosyncratic property. Rather, they 
are closely related with a linguistically real notion, 
namely a manner specification. These properties are 
actually predictable based on this notion. Thus, the 
present study contributes to the generative enter-
prise which aims at minimizing unpredictable facts 
of human language. 
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